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Abstract
Almost a decade ago, Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1988, p. 450), two
of the leaders in the formalist branch of the New Institutional Economics, made
the following observation. ”The incentive based transaction costs theory has been
made to carry too much of the weight of explanation in the theory of organiza-
tions. We expect competing and complementary theories to emerge - theories that
are founded on economizing on bounded rationality and that pay more attention to
changing technology and to evolutionary considerations.” This paper argues that
such theories are now emerging. We survey and synthesize a developing perspec-
tive that we label the ”capabilities” view. We argue that this view complements
incentive-based theory (1) by considering the problems of imperfect knowledge
in production as well as in governance and (2) by considering issues not only of
incentive alignment but also of qualitative coordination among holders of special-
ized, distributed, and often tacit knowledge. Also, focusing on capabilities brings
to the fore the idea that routines and similar rule-based forms of institutionalized
knowledge may be important building blocks of economic organization. As a re-
sult, the capabilities approach arguably connects more fully with the New Institu-
tional Economics, in which rule based guides to action like norms and conventions
play a fundamental role, than do approaches that take the transaction as the unit
of analysis.
1I. Introduction
In the last 25 year or so, the economics of organization inspired by the
seminal work of Ronald Coase (1937) has emerged, perhaps belatedly, as a
thriving branch of economics.  In spite of some not inconsiderable variety among
the contributions to this field, it is fair to say that the literature is in agreement
on the fundamentals.  The basic insight is this: in addition to production costs of
the usual sort, one must also consider transaction costs in explaining institutions
like the firm.  Whether called transaction-cost economics (Williamson 1975, 1985)
or the economics of organization more broadly (Milgrom and Roberts 1992), this
blossoming filed has indeed focused precisely on the comparative transaction
costs of alternative organizational structures, including, paradigmatically, the
choice between firms and markets.  Moreover, the literature has seen the
“nature” of the firm — and, indeed, of other institutions — as fundamentally
contractual.1  Firms and other institutions are alternative bundles of contracts,
understood as mechanisms for creating and realigning incentives.  To put it
another way, the economics of organization has shown a tendency (albeit an
imperfect tendency) to respect an implict dichotomy between the production
aspects and the exchange aspects of the firm — that is, between production costs
and transaction costs.
We do not mean to say by this that present-day theory depicts production
as completely unaffected by exchange.  In fact, the crucial point of some
extremely influential recent research has been to demonstrate rigorously that
                                                 
1 And this is arguably so even for those who do not follow Steven Cheung (1983) and others
in seeing the firm as nothing other than a “nexus of contracts.”
2alternative organizational structures might be chosen because they imply
different incentives to invest in specific assets (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart
1995).  In many recent models, indeed, technology and organizational structure
are determined jointly (Riordan and Williamson 1985; Milgrom and Roberts
1990).  What we do mean is rather that there exists an odd and unjustified
allocation of responsibilites between price theory and the economics of
organization.  To price theory has been consigned the basic theory of production,
with an implicit agreement that the production function, and its attendant
assumptions, tells us what we need to know about production costs.  In price
theory, productive knowledge is seldom portrayed as imperfect or asymmetric,
let alone tacit or “sticky” (Demsetz 1988; Winter 1988).  Knowledge about
alternative production possibilities is explicit, freely transmissable, and easily
encapsulated in what Joan Robinson (1956) called “blueprints.”
By contrast, imperfect knowledge is arguably the raison d’être of the
modern literature on the economics of organization.  To an overwhelming
extent, however, all such imperfections — all deviations from the assumptions of
the production-function formulation — are seen as falling exclusively in the
realm of transaction costs.  In today’s economics of organization, transacting is
fraught with hazards, and the problem of organization is one of creating
governance structures to constrain the unproductive rent-seeking behavior that
imperfect information permits.  Indeed, it is probably not unfair to say that the
heuristic driving this literature is to reduce virtually all problems of economic
organization to problems of misaligned incentives attendant on imperfect
information.
3The result of this partition of responsibilities has been an imbalance in the
economics of organization.  Seldom if ever have economists of organization
considered that knowledge may be imperfect in the realm of production, and
that institutional forms may play the role not (only) of constraining
unproductive rent-seeking behavior but (also) of creating the possibilities for
productive rent-seeking behavior in the first place.  To put it another way,
economists have neglected the benefit side of alternative organizational
structures; for reasons of history and technique, they have allocated most of their
resources to the cost side. 2
Our goal here is to attempt briefly to document and criticize this
intellectual partition.  More importantly, however, we suggest that the partition
is beginning to break down.  This latter point has not gone entirely unnoticed.
Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1988, p.450), two of the leaders in the formalist
branch of the post-Coase literature, made the following prediction almost a
decade ago.  “The incentive based transaction costs theory has been made to
carry too much of the weight of explanation in the theory of organizations.  We
expect competing and complementary theories to emerge - theories that are
founded on economizing on bounded rationality and that pay more attention to
changing technology and to evolutionary considerations.”  We claim that these
theories are now emerging.
                                                 
2 We are not alone in this view.  In his recent review essay on Milgrom and Roberts (1992), a
widely cited textbook treatment of the modern economics of organization, Brian Loasby
notes that, “despite their ready acknowledgement of [Alfred] Chandler’s work, Milgrom
and Roberts prefer the transaction as the unit of analysis, and do not enquire into the
productive activities which a firm undertakes.  The final chapter, of only ten pages, skims
over technical change, team production, the creation of capabilities and organizational
entrepreneurship” (Loasby 1995, p. 475).
4Thus, we will document the development of a corpus of promising
theories of the firm - here called generically “the capabilities view” - that are
more conscious of the character and limitations of knowledge on the production
side than is the mainstream post-Coase literature.  These theories, we argue,
have distinct implications for economic organization - implications that are not
easily reached within the confines of the mainstream literature on the economics
of organization.
Admittedly, the emerging capabilities view is even more heterogeneous
than the post-Coase literature, partly because of its diverse backgrounds in
business history and strategy, evolutionary economics, and technology studies
(more on this in section IV).3  However, we believe that it is possible to
reconstruct one of the central concerns of this body of literature in terms of a
revitalized attention to the importance of production costs — now recast in a
new way — for understanding the problem of economic organization.  One of
our important goals here is to bring the capabilities view more centrally into the
ken of economists.  We offer it not as a finely honed theory but as a developing
area of research whose potential remains relatively untapped.  Moreover, we
present the capabilities view not as an alternative to the transaction-cost
approach but as a complementary area of research.
                                                 
3 We also think of the capabilities perspective as in many ways a return to common sense
notions that many economists have had all along.  In other words, while the capabilities
perspective has not been a part of “formal” economics, it has been a part of the economist’s
more “appreciative” theorizing.  (On the distinction between formal and appreciative
theory, see Nelson and Winter (1982, p.46).)
5II. Production and Governance: the Post-Coase Literature
As we will argue in more detail below, there are in fact two principal theoretical
avenues closed off by a conception of organization as the solution to a problem
of incentive alignment.  And both have to do with the question of production
knowledge.  One is the possibility that knowledge about how to produce is
imperfect — or, as we would prefer to say, dispersed, bounded, sticky and
idiosyncratic.  The second is the possibility that knowledge about how to link
together one person’s (or organization’s) productive knowledge with that of
another is also imperfect.  The first possibility leads us to the issue of capabilities
or competences; the second leads to the issue of qualitative coordination.
Although Coase may have put aside the issue of capabilities, he did not
neglect the issue of coordination.  In the 1937 article, he lists several sources of
those “costs of using the price mechanism” that give rise to the institution of the
firm.  In part, these are the costs of writing contracts.  The “most obvious cost of
‘organising’ production through the price mechanism is that of discovering what
the relevant prices are” (Coase 1937, p. 390).  A second type of cost is that of
executing separate contracts for each of the multifold market transactions that
would be necessary to coordinate some complex production activity.  These costs
can be avoided by firm organization.  However, a careful reading of the paper
suggests that it is ultimately a quite different type of contracting cost that attracts
Coase’s attention.  After pointing out that the nature of the firm consists largely
in substituting an employment contract for a spot contract in output,4 Coase
                                                 
4 As Herbert Simon (1957) explains the employment relation, the capitalist pays a wage for
the right to choose which action x Î W the worker will perform at any time, where W is the
“job description” or set of allowable actions to which the worker agrees.
6suggests that the real costs of contracts may lie in their inflexibility.  “It may be
desired to make a long-term contract for the supply of some article or service,”
he writes.
Now, owing to the difficulty of forecasting, the longer the period of
the contract is for the supply of the commodity or service, the less
possible, and indeed, the less desirable it is for the person
purchasing to specify what the other contracting party is expected
to do. It may well be a matter of indifference to the person
supplying the service or commodity which of several courses of
action is taken, but not to the purchaser of that commodity or
service. But the purchaser will not know which of these several
courses he will want the supplier to take.  Therefore, the service
which is being provided is expressed in general terms, the exact
details being left until a later date. ... The details of what the
supplier is expected to do is not stated in the contract but is
decided later by the purchaser.  When the direction of resources
(within the limits of the contract) becomes dependent on the buyer
in this way, that relationship which I term a “firm” may be
obtained. (Coase 1937, pp. 391-392.)
A close reading of this passage suggests that Coase’s explanation for the
emergence of the firm is ultimately a coordination one: the firm is an institution
that lowers the costs of qualitative coordination in a world of uncertainty.
7Largely in a quest to make Coase’s ideas more “operational,” the
literature has arguably both narrowed his explanation for the firm and moved its
focus away from issues of coordination, especially qualitative coordination.
More precisely, both the issue of capabilities and the issue of the coordination of
production — in the sense of aligning the knowledge and expectations of the
parties who need to cooperate in production5 — have been overshadowed by a
dominant interest in issues of incentive compatibility.
Oliver Williamson, the flagbearer of the field since the 1970s, certainly
cannot be accused of having a narrow conception of transaction-cost economics.
But, in a manner far more explicit than Coase, he has upheld the partition
between transaction costs and production costs.  This he argues as a pragmatic
methodological postulate: hold production costs constant and look only at
transaction costs.  “A useful strategy for explicating the decision to integrate,” he
says, “is to hold technology constant across alternative modes of organization
and to neutralize obvious sources of differential economic benefit” (Williamson
1985, p. 88).  This may indeed be a sensible starting point, so long as it is not an
ending point.
In Williamson’s early work (particularly Williamson 1975), issues of
coordination figured prominently.  For example, in an echo of the passage from
Coase cited above, Williamson argued that internal organization may be a
superior mode of coordination whenever boundedly rational transactors
confront uncertainty.
                                                 
5 This type of coordination was strongly emphasized by Harold Malmgren (1961) in what is
arguably the first “operationalization” of Coase (1937).  Langlois and Cosgel (1993) argue
that this was also ultimately Frank Knight’s explanation of the firm.
8If, in consideration of these [cognitive] limits, it is very costly or
impossible to identify future contingencies and specify, ex ante,
appropriate adaptations thereto, long-term contracts may be
supplanted by internal organization.  Recourse to the latter permits
adaptations to uncertainty to be accomplished by administrative
processes in a sequential fashion.  Thus, rather than attempt to
anticipate all possible contingencies from the outset, the future is
permitted to unfold.  Internal organization in this way economizes
on the bounded rationality attributes of decision makers in
circumstances in which prices are not “sufficient statistics” and
uncertainty is substantial. 6  (Williamson 1975, p. 9.)
But Williamson’s interest in coordination appears to have declined over time in
favor of a greater preoccupation with incentive issues.  Along with Klein,
Crawford, and Alchian (1978), Williamson (1985) focused in on what has become
perhaps the central concept in the present-day economics of organization: asset
specificity.  It is a concept that has virtually come to crowd out all others in the
explanatory pantheon.  “The main factor to which transaction-cost economics
appeals to explain vertical integration,” he now believes, “is asset specificity”
(Williamson 1986, p. 189).
The logic is basically simple.  Assets are highly specific when they have
value within the context of a particular transaction but have relatively little value
                                                 
6 What Williamson here means by prices not being “sufficient statistics” — a reference to his
interpretation of Hayek (1945) on the virtues of the price system — is that internal
organization may be superior in situations requiring qualitative coordination, that is, the
transmission and use of information beyond price and quantity.
9outside the transaction.  This opens the door to opportunism.  Once the contract
is signed and the assets deployed, one of the parties may threaten to pull out of
the arrangement — thereby reducing the value of the specific assets — unless a
greater share of the quasi-rents of joint production find their way into the threat-
maker’s pockets.  Fear of such “hold up” ex post will affect investment choices ex
ante.  In the absence of appropriate contractual safeguards,7 the transacting
parties may choose less specific — and therefore less specialized and less
productive — technology.  If, by contrast, the transacting parties were to pool
their capital into a single enterprise in whose profits they jointly shared, the
incentives for unproductive rent-seeking would be attenuated.  And, because
such unified organizations would choose the more productive specialized
technology, they would win out in the competitive struggle against the
contractual alternative.8
The explanation from asset specificity is at base an argument about the
alignment of incentives, even if it ultimately rests on imperfect information.  In a
world of certainty and unrestricted cognitive ability (if one could imagine such a
place), it would be easy to write and enforce long-term contracts that preempt ex
ante unproductive rent-seeking behavior ex post and thus obviate internalization.
This insight, indeed, has inspired one important formal strand of the literature.
The work of Oliver Hart and others (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart 1995;
Moore 1992) — called the incomplete-contracts literature — distinguishes two
types of rights under contract: specific rights and residual rights.  The latter are
                                                 
7 For example, a hostage.  See Williamson (1985, chapters 7 and 8).
8 This way of putting it gives an explicitly evolutionary spin to the functionalist argument
more typical in transaction-cost economics.  On this see Langlois (1984, 1986).
10
generic rights to make production decisions in circumstances not spelled out in
the contract.  In this literature, the choice between contract and internal
organization reduces to a question of the efficient allocation of the residual rights
of control when contracts are incomplete and assets highly specific.  Suppose
there are two parties cooperating in production, each bringing to the
arrangement a bundle of assets.  If none of the assets is highly specific,
opportunism is impossible ceteris paribus, as either party can liquidate at no or
low cost as soon as troublesome unforeseen contingencies arise.  If, however,
assets are specific, or if opportunism becomes possible for other reasons, it may
be efficient to place the residual rights of control in the hands of only one of the
parties by giving that party ownership of both sets of assets.9  In general, the
owner ought to be the party whose possession of the residual right minimizes
rent-seeking costs, which typically means the party whose contribution to the
quasirents of cooperation is greater.
This is all well and good as far as it goes, which, in some respects, is not
nearly as far as the mainstream economics of organization seems to think.  The
emphasis in the literature on misaligned incentives obscures, in our view, the
fundamental role that institutions (including the firm) play in qualitative
coordination, that is, in helping cooperating parties to align not their incentives
                                                 
9 Hart and his colleagues hold that the possession of the residual rights of control
necessitates ownership of the firm’s capital assets, whether tangible or intangible.  This
allows them to do something few in the literature have been able to do: to define the
boundaries of the firm crisply and consistently.  For them, a firm is defined by the bundle
of assets under common ownership.  (This stands in contrast to the “nexus of contracts”
view, which sees the firm as a far more fuzzy notion, and to the related principal/agent
theory, in which it is not possible to assign alternative contractual arrangements to specific
organizational structures: a contract between employer and employee is not necessarily
different from a contract between a firm and its supplier).
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but their knowledge and expectations. All recognize that knowledge is imperfect
and that most economically interesting contracts are, as a consequence,
incomplete.  But most of the literature considers seriously as coordinating
devices only contracts and the incentives the embody.  It thus neglects the role -
the potentially far more important role - of routines and capabilities as
coordinating devices.  Moreover, the assumption that production costs are
distinct from transaction costs and that production costs can and should always
be held constant obscures the way productive knowledge is generated and
transmitted in the economy.
A striking example of this incentive-oriented research strategy can be
found in a recent paper by Rotemberg and Saloner (1994).  They address one of
the key ideas of the corporate strategy and capabilities literature, namely, that
firms may be best off choosing narrow strategies.  Specifically, Rotemberg and
Saloner use the incomplete-contracts framework to argue that a firm may choose
a narrow strategy (and thus ignore profitable opportunities) because strategic
breadth leads to implementation problems ex post that distort ex ante incentives.
They do note (p. 1131) that “increasing returns to specialization” (because of
learning advantages from concentrating on well-defined capabilities) may be an
independent reason for narrow strategies, but they do not investigate that
possibility.  The problem is not that such reformulations in terms of incentives
are internally inconsistent.  Rather, the issue is whether the mechanisms so
identified are in fact plausible explanations of the phenomena under study, a
question that economists do not typically feel required to pose let alone answer.
In fact, it is quite likely that the mechanisms underneath narrow firm strategies
12
have little or nothing to do with the alignment of incentives, and have
everything to do with limited knowledge and capabilities.
More generally, we are worried that conceptualizing all problems of
economic organization as problems of aligning incentives not only misrepresents
important phenomena but also hinders understanding other phenomena, such as
the role of production costs in determining the boundaries of the firm.  As we
will argue, in fact, it may well pay off intellectually to pursue a research strategy
that is essentially the flip-side of the coin, namely to assume that all incentive
problems can be eliminated by assumption and concentrate on coordination
(including communication)  and production-cost issues only.
III. Production Costs Redux: Coordination and Capabilities
A. Key Ideas in the Capabilities Perspective
As we have suggested, there is now emerging a research approach that does
emphasize issues of qualitative coordination and limited production
knowledge.10  We emphasize that talking about “a” or “the” capabilities
perspective in any generic sense is very much in the nature of a reconstruction,
since there are a number of strands of thought involved.  Section IV will try to
separate out those strands; for the moment, however, we will present the
reconstructed version.
                                                 
10 There is also a recent mainstream development that pursues a research strategy that is
similar to this on the overall level, namely the attempt to conceptualize, on the basis of
team-theory, the firm as a communication network (Bolton and Dewatripont 1994).  We
discuss the relation of this work to the capabilities perspective later.
13
What may make it increasingly appropriate to speak of a capabilities
perspective is that a small but growing list of authors has begun self-consciously
referring to their work as lying within the confines of a “capabilities,” “dynamic
capabilities,” or “competence” approach (Langlois 1992; Langlois and Robertson
1995; Kogut and Zander 1992; Foss 1993; Dosi and Marengo 1994; Teece and
Pisano 1994).  These contributions take somewhat different starting points.
Thus, some begin from bounded rationality and other aspects of cognition and
build up a theory of firm-specific knowledge - that is, capabilities - from this
(e.g., Kogut and Zander 1992; Dosi and Marengo 1994), while others begin from
the empirical generalization that productive knowledge is neither explicit nor
freely transferable (e.g., Langlois 1992).  Either way it boils down to the same
common-sense recognition, namely that individuals — and organizations — are
necessarily limited in what they know how to do well.11  Indeed, the main
interest of the capabilities view is to understand what is distinctive about firms
as unitary, historical organizations of cooperating individuals.  Moreover, it is
becoming an increasingly widespread recognition among contributors to the
capabilities view that approaching the firm in this way has fertile implications
not only for understanding the sources of firm heterogeneity, competitive
advantage, and differential rents (Lippman and Rumelt 1982; Wernerfelt 1984)
but also for advancing the economics of organization.
Michael Polanyi (1958) has taught us that knowledge is not all of a form
that can be articulated in words or pictures for easy transmission.  Much
                                                 
11 This was clearly the position of those classical economists, particularly Smith, who wrote
on specialization.   For a reading of the capabilities perspective as the modern heir to the
classical theory of production, see Foss (1996c).
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knowledge — including, importantly, much knowledge about production — is
tacit and can be acquired only through a time-consuming process of learning by
doing.  Moreover, knowledge about production is often essentially distributed
knowledge, that is to say, knowledge that is only mobilized in the context of
carrying out a multi-person productive task; is not possessed by any single
agent, and normally requires some sort of qualitative coordination, for example,
through direction and command, for its efficient use.12  Indeed, capabilities are
precisely characterized by these features: they may be seen as team-embodied
and partly tacit production and organization knowledge that can be employed
by team-members for a strategic purpose.
In a world of tacit and distributed knowledge - that is, of differential
capabilities - having the same blueprints as one’s competitors is unlikely to
translate into having the same costs of production.  Generally, in such a world,
firms will not confront the same production costs for the same type of
productive activity.  Moreover, the costs that can make transacting difficult —
the costs that may lead to internalization or various other business institutions —
may go beyond those that arise in the course of safeguarding against
opportunism or damping moral hazard through monitoring or incentive
contracts.  In such a world, economic activity may be afflicted with “dynamic
transaction costs,”13 the costs that arise in real time in the process of acquiring
                                                 
12 Of course, not all distributed knowledge requires conscious direction for its efficient
utilization; in fact, it is a standard argument in favor of the market order that it better
utilizes distributed knowledge than any known directed order (Hayek 1945).  However, as
we shall later argue, firms may derive part of their raison d’être from their (sometimes)
superior abilities to coordinate (some) types of distributed knowledge. Thus, what we are
after is a knowledge-based theory of the existence and boundaries of the firm.
13 Loosely, and perhaps somewhat cryptically, dynamic transaction costs are the costs of not
having the capabilities you need when you need them (Langlois 1992).
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and coordinating productive knowledge (Langlois 1992; Langlois and Robertson
1995) and which are different in nature from the transaction costs that are caused
by problems of aligning incentives.  This, in turn, implies that the capabilities
may be interpreted as a distinct theory of economic organization.
B. The Capabilities Perspective as a Theory of Economic Organization
A key implication of the capabilities perspective as it relates to economic
organization is that, in the terminology of G. B. Richardson (1972), the structure
of complementarity and similarity among the various capabilities in the
economy affects the pattern of organization (including the firm-market
boundary) in ways not fully explicable in terms of the costs of transacting.
Indeed, the ability to transact (and therefore the cost of transacting) is itself a
capability (Winter 1988), which suggests a blurring of the boundary between
production and exchange.
The idea that capabilities may be an independent causal factor behind the
pattern of economic organization has recently received support from the doyen of
business historians, Alfred D. Chandler.14  He traces the neglect of production in
the post-Coase literature to its choice of the isolated transaction as unit of
analysis.  By contrast, “if the firm is the unit of analysis, instead of the transaction,”
Chandler says, “then the specific nature of the firm's facilities and skills becomes the
                                                 
14 This may be contrasted with Chandler’s earlier support for Williamson’s brand of
transaction cost economics. Chandler (1992, p.85) says that although he has “learned much
from Williamson,” there is a basic difference between them which has to do with the unit of
analysis. Chandler goes on to endorse “the recently formulated evolutionary theory of the
firm,” which is roughly identical to the capabilities perspective.
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most significant factor in determining what will be done in the firm and what by the
market”15 (Chandler 1992, p.86).
Even more striking, Ronald Coase (1990, p.11) has himself voiced similar
views.
[W]hile transaction cost considerations undoubtedly explain why
firms come into existence, once most production is carried out
within firms and most transactions are firm-firm transactions and
not factor-factor transactions, the level of transaction costs will be
greatly reduced and the dominant factor determining the
institutional structure of production will in general no longer be
transaction costs but the relative costs of different firms in
organizing particular activities.
However, it was G. B. Richardson who introduced the term “capabilities” to talk
about the necessarily limited range of productive knowledge firms and
individuals possess.  Taking issue with the representation of knowledge in the
production-function approach, Richardson writes:
Of course I realise that production functions presume a certain
level of managerial and material technology.  The point is not that
production is thus dependent on the state of the arts but that it has
                                                 
15 Of course, taking the firm as the unit of analysis makes it difficult to study the rationale for
and the boundaries of the firm.  Langlois and Robertson (1995) suggest taking capabilities
and routines as the fundamental units of analysis.  This has the benefit of placing the
economics or organization more firmly within the structure of the New Institutional
Economics more broadly (Langlois 1986), in which norms and conventions — which, like
routines, are rule-based guides to action — are the fundamental concepts.
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to be undertaken (as Mrs. Penrose16 has so very well explained) by
organisations embodying specifically appropriate experience and
skill.  It is this circumstance that formal production theory tends to
put out of focus, and justifiably, no doubt, given the character of
the optimisation problem that it is designed to handle;
nevertheless, it seems to me that we cannot hope to construct an
adequate theory of industrial organization and in particular to
answer our question about the division of labour between firm and
market, unless the elements of organisation, knowledge, experience
and skills are brought back to the foreground of our vision.
(Richardson 1972, p. 888).
In Richardson’s terminology, production can be broken down into various stages
or activities.  Some activities are similar, in that they draw on the same general
capabilities. Activities can also be complementary (in both a technical and an
economic sense) in that they are connected in the chain of production and
therefore need to be coordinated with one another.  Juxtaposing different
degrees of similarity against different degrees of complementarity produces a
matrix that maps different types of economic organization.  For example, closely
complementary and similar activities may be best undertaken under unified
governance.
Complementarity is clearly an increasingly important theme in today’s
economics of organization (Milgrom and Roberts 1990); indeed, there is a
widespread recognition that “strongly complementary assets should be brought
                                                 
16 On whom see below.
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under common ownership” (Milgrom and Roberts 1992, p. 312).  But the real
force of Richardson’s argument is in quite a different direction.  In Richardson,
the import of the concept of capabilities was their limitations.  Because of what
are effectively cognitive constraints, all organizations must specialize; and, since
the chain of production in an advanced economy requires a diversity of very
different capabilities, the costs of integrating across many links in that chain are
necessarily high, and firms must rely on various kinds of market and hybrid
arrangements to coordinate their activities even in the face of contractual
hazards.17  Although transaction costs may outweigh the costs of dissimilarity in
the case of some closely complementary activities, on the whole the limitations of
capabilities outweigh transaction costs.  As Brian Loasby (1991) has observed,
Richardson thus stands on its head a principal, albeit tacit, presumption of
transaction-cost economics, namely that, because contractual relationships
among firms are fraught with hazards, integration must on the whole be
relativley less costly and thus widely desirable.
Richardson’s insight is a simple but extremely profound one.  For it
suggests that - as a quite general matter - capabilities are determinants of the
boundaries of the firm, since they determine, in Coase’s words, “the relative costs
                                                 
17 A related, if not identical, position has been adopted by David Teece (1982, 1986), one of
the few major scholars to have incorporated Richardson’s ideas.  Unlike Richardson, who
discusses the coordination of complementary activities, Teece talks about complementary
assets that might be cospecialized to one another.  As with Richardson’s closely
complementary activities, cospecialized assets may be difficult tto coordinate.  But, unlike
Richardson, Teece is inclined, with the broader incentive-based asset-specificity literature
that has influenced him, to believe that cospecialized assets may be a cause of integration
more than of cooperation, especially to the extent that integration allows an innovator to
appropriate the gains from innovation in regimes in which intellectual property rights are
ineffective. Thus, for Teece governance structures alternative to the market arise to prevent
slippery innovative knowledge from escaping the grasp of its creators, just as, in the main
current of the transaction-cost literature, alternative governance structures emerge to
protect transactors from the “plasticity” of contract.
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of different firms in organizing particular activities.”  Problems of economic
organization may crucially reflect the possibility that a firm may control production
knowledge that is, in important dimensions, strongly different from what others
control.  Thus members of one firm may quite literally not understand what another
firm wants from them (for example, in supplier contracts) or is offering them (for
example, in license contracts).  Because of the extreme specificity and tacitness of
much productive knowledge, one firm may have difficulties understanding another
firm’s capabilities; and both firms separately and together may know more than
their contracts can tell (Kogut and Zander 1992; Winter 1993).  In this setting, the
costs of making contacts with potential partners, of educating potential licensees and
franchisees, of teaching suppliers what it is one needs from them, etc., become very
real factors determining where the boundaries of firms will be placed.
Note that these dynamic transaction costs are in a different category from the
transaction costs usually considered in the post-Coase literature.  Transacting
difficulties are not a matter of incentive problems within an otherwise well-defined
and well-understood exchange context.  Rather, coordination problems may arise
because capabilities exhibit too much “friction”:  the knowledge, skills, and
traditions embodied in existing governance structures (be they firms, markets, or
in between) may be too inflexible, especially in the face of major
“Schumpeterian” change, to seize market and technological opportunities.  In
such circumstances, other governance structures that can muster the necessary
capabilities may arise and prosper.
Morris Silver (1984) has suggested, for example, that much vertical
integration arises not when firms venture into areas of similar capabilities but
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when firms are dragged, kicking and screaming, as it were, into complementary
but dissimilar activities because only in that way can they bring about a
profitable reconfiguration of production or distribution.  Langlois and Robertson
(1995) build a broad theory of industrial dynamics around this idea.  The
organizational question is whether new capabilities are best acquired through
the market, through internal learning, or through some hybrid organizational
form.  And the answer will depend on (A) the already-existing structure of
capabilities and (B) the nature of the economic change involved.
If a profit opportunity requires a configuration of capabilities different
from what already exists in the economy, then a Schumpeterian process of
creative destruction may be set in motion.  If the old configuration of capabilities
is decentralized into what we may loosely call markets, then a reorganization
within a single organization — vertical integration — may most cheaply bring
about the necessary redeployment.  If, by contrast, the old configuration of
capabilities lies within large vertically integrated organizations, creative
destruction may well take the form of markets superseding firms.  History offers
many examples of both.
The organizational possibilities are tempered by the nature of the
reconfiguration required.  If change is systemic — if it requires simultaneous
change in many parts of a complex system — internal organization may prove
less costly ceteris paribus.  If, however, change is autonomous — if change can take
place in separate subsystems without greatly affecting the way those subsystems
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are connected together — then markets, which can take advantage of specialized
and decentralized knowledge, may be at a relative advantage.18
The upshot of all this, we suggest, is that there now exists a distinct basis
- a collection of ideas, concepts and mechanisms - for the capabilities view as a
theory of economic organization, at least with respect to the boundaries of the
firm.  But what about the empirical evidence?  Writers like Chandler (1962, 1977,
1990, 1992), Lazonick (1991), and Langlois and Robertson (1995) enlist economic
and business history in support of a capabilities view.  But more quantitative
empirical studies also suggest that differential capabilities, and therefore
production costs, are significant variables for explaining the boundaries of the
firm.  In Walker and Weber's (1984) empirical study of the make-or-buy
decision, the most important explanatory variable turned out to be the indicator
for differential firm capabilities, that is, for production costs.  And, in a study by
Monteverde and Teece (1982), which set out to find support for the standard
contractual approach, the most significant variable was actually the dummy for
the firm, reflecting heterogenous and unobserved firm effects (Kogut and
Zander 1992, p. 394).
IV.  Capabilities and Contemporary Research Themes
In this section, we discuss how the capabilities perspective relates to a variety of
streams of thought originating from a variety of problems.  Just as the post-
                                                 
18 The terms “systemic” and “autonomous” are from Teece (1986).  In the case of autonomous
innovation, the issue of standards enters the picture: for standards are typically ways of
fixing the connections among subsystems so that change is channeled in autonomous
directions.  Langlois and Robertson (1992, 1995) call this kind of structure a modular system.
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Coase literature on the economics of organization has not been developed in an
intellectual vacuum, so the capabilities perspective very much reflects a number
of diverse influences.  And, although the roots of the capabilities approach
stretch quite far back in history, and although - until recently - the various
influences have been developed independently, the emergence of the capabilities
perspective seems in fact to mark a growing realization of the possibilities of
convergence.  Thus, we wish to provide a brief conspectus of the sources of the
capabilities aproach; of the many intellectual alliances that this perspective has
struck or may strike; and of the work of a number of researchers who have been
involved in developing capabilities insights.
What we have said so far about the post-Coase literature on the economics
of organization also makes it obvious and necessary to undertake a more
detailed discussion of how the capabilities perspective relates to this literature.
But there are numerous other connections: to strategic management and
organizational learning; to business history; to the economics of technology; to
evolutionary economics; and to the economics of institutions.
A. Antecedent and Related Fields
How can firms make best use of their distinctive capabilities?  How have they
done this in the past?  And how can they go on developing new valuable
capabilities?  Such questions have been central in the strategy field since its
inception at the end of the 1950s, and in the related field of business history, at
least since Alfred D. Chandler’s (1962) demonstration of the importance of
organizational capabilities to the restructuring of the American economy that
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began in the middle of the last century.  This three-decades-long interest in
capabilities should be contrasted with the lack of interest shown by economists,
at least until recently.
The conceptualization of the firm that underlies this work was perhaps
best expressed in the late Edith Penrose’s The Theory of the Growth of the Firm
(1959), a conceptualization she explicitly differentiated from the prevailing
production-function view. “The firm,” Penrose says, is “a collection of
productive resources the disposal of which between different uses and over time
is determined by administrative decision” (Penrose 1959, p. 24).  Now, resources
in Penrose’s view yield services, and it is these services - clearly a theoretical
precursor to the concept of capabilities - that interest her the most.  Because
resources/services become specialized to firms - and mesh with each other in a
team-like manner - they are worth more to the firm than to the market (meaning
other firms).  They therefore yield quasi-rents, some of which may be
appropriated by the firm’s owners.  Moreover, although resources/services are
firm-specific, they are nevertheless somewhat “fungible” inside the firm, and,
when in excess, provide a stepping-stone for diversifying to new markets.
Penrose’s work helped define at least three distinct areas of research.  The
first one partially stems from her insistence that specialized resources/services
yield rents; this has helped found what is today referred to as the resource-based
perspective in contemporary firm-strategy research (Lippman and Rumelt 1982;
Wernerfelt 1984).  The primary contribution associated with the resource-based
perspective is a thorough analysis of the conditions under which resources yield
rents. Thus, heterogeneous, immobile and hard-to-imitate resources that are,
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moreover, acquired in imperfect factor markets (so that there may be a difference
between the price of the resource and its value to an acquiring firm) are rent-
yielding strategic assets to firms.
A second relevant area of research is the study of diversification (e.g., Teece
1982; Dosi, Teece, and Winter 1992), where Penrose’s notion of excess
capabilities, combined with transaction-cost considerations, is perhaps the
dominant mode of explanation (Montgomery 1994).  Roughly speaking, the story
is this.  As firms carry on their normal business, they are likely to accumulate
excess resources, for example, excess managerial capabilities.  In principle, rents
from these resources may be captured in different ways, for example, through
market exchange, long-term contracts, or in-house use.  Because of transaction-
cost problems, which may be particularly severe when the excess resources
involved are knowledge resources, in-house use is more efficient, and the firm
will accordingly apply the resources that are in excess to neighboring markets.
The third area of research that Penrose’s work helped to establish is the
study of organizational learning, which also owes a heavy debt to such seminal
contributions to organization theory as March and Simon (1958) and Cyert and
March (1963).  Penrose argued that the management team holds images of the
external environment and of the firm’s internal resources; that these images are
produced through internal learning processes; and that they determine “the
productive opportunity set” of the firm, that is, the productive possibilities that that
the firm’s “’entrepreneurs’ see and can take advantage of” (Penrose 1959, p.31).
The idea of the image as a shared firm-specific vision, and the implication
that firms are in essence cognitive communities, is more radical than the - now
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more standard - ideas of bounded rationality and tacit knowledge in action or of
firms as essentially processors of (objective) information (Fransman 1994).19
And, with the possible exception of Arrow (1974), Loasby (1976), and Crémer
(1990), few economists have shown interest in Penrose’s idea, although it is
standard in contemporary organization theory (James March 1988).  The image is
more radical because it explicitly recognizes that agents have to make sense of
their world, that agents' cognitive development is molded in social processes,
and because it implies that tacitness is an aspect of virtually all acts of
interpretation and meaning attribution (Marengo, 1995).  In this view, the
essence of decision making is not making a choice among pre-given alternatives;
it is a matter of construing something resembling a decision situation by
defining which variables are relevant, which in turn requires making sense of
the environment, setting up procedures for solving the problem, etc.
Clearly, such a view of decision-making emphasizes the importance of
coordination problems, but also points to a coordinative role for capabilities.  As
Langlois (1984) and Marengo (1995) argue, if agents entering the firm held the
completely same habits of thought/models of the world, the only obstacle to
efficient coordination of their actions would be precisely the sort of incentive
problems that preoccupy modern organizational economists.  However, in a
world in which agents do not share exactly the same models and do not know
                                                 
19 Langlois (1996) has argued that the set of capabilities available to an organization, and the
way in which those capabilities are arranged, constitute the organization’s cognitive
structure, that is, its mechanism for perceiving technological and market opportunities.
Thus, knowledge within the organization is perhaps even more widely distributed and
variegated that the notion of an “image” suggests, and is not always confined to
management.
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each others' models, a collective knowledge base is required for coordination
(Crémer 1990).
As simulations built on the theory of classifier systems demonstrate (Holland and
Miller 1991), such a knowledge base may develop as a result of organizational
learning under rather general assumptions (Marengo 1995).  These attempts to
construct a theory of capabilities from ideas about behavior founded in organization
theory rather than in maximizing behavior currently enjoys much attention among
evolutionary economists, particularly among Italian and French ones (e.g., Dosi and
Marengo 1994).  The basic idea, however, can be found in Nelson and Winter’s An
Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (1982), particularly chapter 4 and 5.  Their
widely cited analysis of “routines” builds directly on behavioralist organization
theory, as well as on Michael Polanyi’s (1958) analysis of tacit knowledge. In fact,
this analysis is itself an important precursor of modern work on capabilities.
In the evolutionary economics of Nelson and Winter (1982) and many
(other) economists associated with the International Joseph A. Schumpeter
Society, the capabilities view of the firm serves primarily as a micro-foundation
for population-level analysis of industry and technology evolution.  Thus, the
capabilities perspective helps rationalize the variety of behaviors - including
innovative behaviors - that are necessary in any evolutionary account of
industry and technology evolution (Metcalfe 1989); it is an  explanatory
component in a broader explanation, much like the way in which the
neoclassical theory of the firm is basically an explanatory component in
standard price-theory.
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However, there has been some important work on innovation and
technological change that puts the emphasis on the firm level rather than the
population/industry level.  Much of this has been associated with University of
Sussex Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) and with members of the
(University of) Reading school of international business, particularly John
Cantwell (1994).  For example, recent influential work by Keith Pavitt and Pari
Patel (Patel and Pavitt 1994) use systematic information on American patenting
by more than 400 of the world’s largest technologically active firms to
demonstrate that the accumulation of technological capabilities is strongly path-
dependent and that there are therefore severe limits on the range of exploitable
technological opportunities.  Moreover, they argue that technological capabilities
“give a convincing empirical explanation of the boundaries (or - perhaps better
- the core  activities) of firms (p. 2).  In other words, like many other proponents,
Pavitt and Patel see the capabilities perspective as - at least potentially - an
alternative theory of economic organization.  We treat this issue in  further detail
in the next section.
B. The Capabilities Perspective and the Modern Economics of Organization
We have interpreted the capabilities perspective as reaching for a distinct theory
of economic organization, one that is based on a conceptualization of the firm as
a repository of productive knowledge with certain non-standard characteristics,
what we have here called “capabilities.”  In this story, incentive issues are
suppressed in favor of a focus on problems of coordinating knowledge and
expectations.  We have chided the profession for its lopsided choice of the
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opposite approach and for its dramatic overemphasis on transaction costs and
incentive alignment, to the exclusion of production costs and issues of
coordination, in explaining economic organization.
However, there has recently been some stimulating work that explicitly
focuses on the coordination of knowledge and expectations in a team-theoretic
framework (Arrow 1985; Crémer 1990; Radner 1992, 1996; Bolton and
Dewatripont 1994).  In these models, incentives move into the background.
Building on earlier ideas in Marschak and Radner (1972) and Arrow (1974),
these writers view the firm as a communication network that is designed to
minimize both the cost of processing new information and the costs of
communicating this information among agents.  Communication is costly
because it takes time for agents to absorb new information sent by others, but
this time may be reduced by specializing in the processing of particular types of
information.  In Bolton and Dewatripont’s (1994) model, for example, each agent
handles a particular type of information, and the different types of information
are aggregated through the communication network.  When the benefits to
specializing outweigh the costs of communication, teams (firms) arise.
Arguably, such work captures some of the main ideas of the capabilities
perspective as we have interpreted it; for example, there is an emphasis on the
need for qualitative coordination, on specialization in handling knowledge, on
firm-specific “codes” of communication (Arrow 1974), and on bounded
rationality (Radner 1996).  We conjecture that this work will become increasingly
important as first steps towards the formalization of capabilities ideas.
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In spite of this conjecture, one should not reject the more standard
incentive-oriented work as a natural complement to the capabilities view.  In
fact, future work may center around modelling capabilities and incentive
considerations in the same model,20 so that, for example, the role of both
production costs and transaction costs in determining the boundaries of the firm
becomes more visible than it is in the post-Coase literature on the economics of
organization.  In this respect, it is noteworthy that Williamson’s primary design
principle for efficient economic organization has been changed to reflect
capabilities considerations:  “Align transactions, which differ in their attributes,
with governance structures, which differ in their costs and competencies in a
discriminating (mainly, transaction cost economizing) way” (Williamson 1991, p.
79).  Thus, Williamson now thinks of competencies (i.e., capabilities) as determinants
of governance more-or-less on a par with transaction costs.  In other words, the
notion of the firm as a bundle of capabilities may harmonize with key ideas of the
post-Coase literature.  An excellent specific example is a model by Lewis and
Sappington (1991). They analyze the firm’s make-and-buy decision under the
assumption that its subcontractor is known to have lower innate production costs
(i.e., superior capabilities) but the firm is better able to monitor and control its own
production activities.  Lewis and Sappington perform various comparative-static
exercises in this setting; for example, they examine how the firm’s boundaries choice
varies with technological change that influences production  costs and monitoring,
                                                 
20 Promising recent work by Aghion and Tirole (1995) incorporates both incentive
considerations and information-processing considerations that are akin to the thrust of the
capabilities view.
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so that both incentive and capabilities considerations are allowed to enter the
picture.
In the following, we briefly present a few further suggestions as to how, more
specifically, key ideas from the two perspectives may be aligned.21 These
suggestions keep intact the basic idea that economic organization is first and
foremost a matter of efficiently aligning incentives; capabilites considerations merely
serve to help extend the applicability of this basic idea.  This is an interesting and
legitimate research strategy, as long as we do not forget to also consider the other
side of the coin: that capabilities considerations may be primary and incentive
considerations secondary.
Capabilities and intra-firm agency problems. The argument here is that
capabilities in firms may influence the outcomes of principal-agent-type
problems: firms will often be characterized by a distinct “way of doing things”
that is coded in its capabilities and is shared among input-owners.  Precisely
because it is shared (common), the presence of such knowledge may serve to
mitigate moral hazard and adverse-selection problems.22  This is a possible
interpretation of why corporate cultures may be valuable assets to firms.23
Moreover, such an capabilities-cum-agency problems story also helps to
rationalize the scope of firms:  casual empiricism confirms that few firms have
integrated the entire value-chain and that no firm has a stake in every product
                                                 
21 For a fuller discussion of the issues involved here, see Foss (1996b).
22 There is, however, also a conflict between the agency view and the capabilities
perspectives. In the first, heterogeneity of knowledge, preferences and behaviors is
problematic because it causes agency problems; in the latter, it is beneficial, because it
stimulates organizational learning and the development of capabilities.
23 See Kreps (1990) for a slightly different interpretation
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market in the economy, the common explanation being that firms confront
increasingly dissimilar capabilities as they move away from their core business
(Richardson 1972).  A rendering along the lines of the modern economics of
organization may be: as firms move increasingly away from their core
businesses, they confront increasing adverse-selection and moral-hazard
problems, since management becomes increasingly unable efficiently to monitor
employees or to evaluate their human capital.  Agency costs rise
correspondingly, producing the net profitability disadvantage associated with
further integration (for a similar story, see Aghion and Tirole 1995).
Capabilities and Incomplete Contracts.  In the presence of incomplete
contracts and bounded rationality, something more than an allocation of rights is
required to structure intra-firm interaction; firms aren’t held together solely by
the thin glue of transaction-cost minimization, but rather by the thicker glue of
capabilities.  A key aspect of the capabilities critique of the modern economics of
organization is that it too strictly dichomotizes production and
organization/exchange considerations when in reality these are closely
intertwined.  Since the very notion of firm capability combines production and
organization considerations, it is entirely likely that capabilities embodying
knowledge about production at least to some extent also help solve problems of
rent-seeking inside organizations.
Asset specificity and capabilities. As we have argued, the notion of specific
assets is key to the modern economics of organization (but see Demsetz 1988).
Not surprisingly, elaborate lists of types of specific assets have been constructed,
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ranging from patents over dedicated physical equipment to site specificity
(Williamson 1985; Grossman and Hart 1986).
Capabilities would certainly seem to qualify as specific assets - they are
specialized to firms; they have low (or no) value in alternative uses;
managers/owners can hold residual rights as to their use, etc.  But the modern
economics of organization does not normally view them that way (Klein (1988)
and Milgrom and Roberts (1992) are exceptions).24  Part of the reason may be
that capabilities are hard to treat in formal models.  Another part may be that it
is harder to reason about who captures rents from capabilities than from
ordinary factors of production; the underlying bargaining would seem to be
immensely more complicated than the bargaining game being played between
the firm and the owner of an ordinary human-capital input.  However, these
difficulties are not insurmountable in principle, and capabilities deserve a place
on the short-list of empirically important specific assets.
V. Conclusion
Our aim in this paper has been to document the importance of the capabilities
perspective as an emerging perspective on economic organization. It is
characterized by distinct insights, not the least the attempt to restore production
and production costs to their rightful place as determinants of the boundaries of
the firm, and to find a place for qualitative coordination in the theory of
                                                 
24 This does not automatically mean, however, that capabilities are necessarily and under all
circumstances best governed internally.  Apart from the issue that a capability may be too
dissimilar relative to an organization’s other capabilities and is therefore best left to other
firms (Richardson 1972), there is the issue that capabilities may exist on the industry-level
as Marshallian external economies (see Langlois and Robertson 1995; Foss 1996d).
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economic organization.  In other words, the capabilities perspective highlights
explanatory mechanisms that are different from those of the post-Coase
literature on economic organization.  Since the two perspectives may be read as
addressing the same sort of phenomena - notably the existence, boundaries and
internal organization of the firm - and employ theoretical concepts and
mechanisms (incentives vs qualitative coordination, blueprint knowledge vs
capabilities, etc.), they may therefore be interpreted as being competitors.
Although the capabilities view is admittedly less advanced than the post-Coase
literature in terms of formalization and terminological stringency, with respect
to some important phenomena - notably the boundaries of firms - the
capabilities perspective, we have argued, develops more plausible explanatory
mechanisms.
However, rather than stressing rivalry, we emphasize the
complementarity between the two perspectives and the need for more
integrative efforts.  Even if it is not currently fashionable among contributors to
the capabilities perspective, we feel that there are strong arguments in favor of
our position.  Both perspectives may benefit from the ideas and insights of the
other.  There is important mainstream work that, if in no way identical to the
capabilities view, nevertheless suggests how aspects of capabilities ideas may be
formally approached and modeled (Lippman and Rumelt 1982; Arrow 1985;
Bolton and Dewatripont 1994; Aghion and Tirole 1995).
Moreover, when it comes to providing convincing stories about important
empirical phenomena, the relations of complementarity between the post-Coase
literature and the capabilities view may appear even more striking.  For
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example, it is arguably hard to provide convincing stories about diversification
(Teece 1982; Dosi, Teece and Winter 1992) or the organization of the innovation
process (Teece 1986) without relying on both perspectives.  For these reasons, the
perspectives need to be integrated further.  We therefore concur with one of the
major scholars in today’s economics of organization when he observes that “[i]n
order to fully develop its capabilities, transaction cost economics must be joined with
a theory of knowledge and production (Teece  1990, p. 59).  And, in fact, the reverse
may also hold true, that in order to fully develop its capabilities, the capabilities
view must be joined with transaction cost economics.  For example, in order to
understand the process of emergence and accumulation of capabilities, we need to
pay attention to the incentive structure of firms, since this influences investments in
human capital.  In sum, whether we see it from the perspective of the capabilities
perspective or from the perspective of the modern economics of organization, there
is an exciting theoretical frontier ahead.
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